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NOT FOR IMPORT: WHY THE EU SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE 
AMERICAN EFFICIENCY DEFENSE FOR ANALYZING MERGERS 
AND JOINT VENTURES 
THOMAS L. GREANEY* 
“To admit an economies defense that proceeds by measurement would force us 
to an unacceptably narrow horizon.  Economists, like other people, will 
measure what is susceptible of measurement and will tend to forget what is 
not, though what is forgotten may be far more important than what is 
measured.”  
    Robert Bork1 
“The measurement of efficiency. . .[is] an intractable subject for litigation.” 
    Richard Posner2 
 
The avalanche of mergers and joint ventures with international dimensions 
that occurred in the nineties3 has focused attention on the possibility of 
convergence or harmonization of the antitrust standards applied by different 
nations.  As of 1998, over eighty nations had adopted some form of 
competition law, and dozens of other countries had competition statutes on the 
drawing board.4 Multinational review of mergers and joint ventures has 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to Professor Joël Mońeger, 
Universite d’Orleans, for his helpful insights. 
 1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 127 
(1978). 
 2. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976). 
 3. A large percentage of mergers reviewed by American enforcement agencies have 
involved competitive effects beyond American borders.  In fiscal year 1998, thirteen of the 
twenty-eight merger enforcement actions undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission resulted 
in formal notifications to foreign governments, and of those six involved substantial discussions 
with foreign authorities also reviewing the mergers.  In fiscal year 1999, twenty-one of thirty-
eight merger investigations reaching the second requests stage involved notifications to foreign 
governments, of which twelve involved “substantial discussions” with foreign authorities.  
Richard G. Parker, Global Merger Enforcement, remarks at the International Bar Association, 
(Sept. 28, 1999). 
 4. A. DOUGLAS MELAMED, United States Dep’t of Justice, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN A 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (1998). 
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become commonplace, and arrangements for sharing information, cooperating 
at the investigative stages,  and in some instances, deferring to the judgment of 
sister enforcement agencies, have also developed.5  Yet the goal of 
convergence on substantive standards in the form of an international 
competition code faces seemingly insurmountable hurdles rooted in political, 
cultural and philosophical factors.6  At the same time, there is an unmistakable 
evolutionary process by which national authorities have learned from each 
others’ experiences and that have caused substantive standards to move to 
some extent toward convergence. 
Mergers and joint ventures involving large multinational corporations have 
garnered the most attention and the law applied by the world’s most prominent 
enforcers (the American Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 
and the Commission of the European Union) has shown a surprising degree of 
consistency.  This has resulted on numerous occasions in close cooperation, 
sharing of information and agreement on remedy between these agencies.  For 
example, in the ABB/Elsag-Bailey merger, the EU and the FTC were able to 
reach speedy agreement on the dimensions of the market affected by the 
merger (a worldwide market for gas chromatography) and to find common 
ground on an appropriate divestiture.7  Likewise, in the mammoth 
WorldCom/MCI merger, the Justice Department and the EU Commission 
closely cooperated, reaching the same conclusion on the competitive problems 
posed by the merger and agreeing to terms of a proposed divestiture of MCI’s 
 
 5. Probably the most important form of cooperation occurs through cooperation between 
individual antitrust authorities in different nations.  These arrangements are facilitated by bi-
lateral agreements between nations or authorities that provide for notification of investigations 
affecting the other nation’s interests and cooperation in the evidence gathering process.  See, e.g., 
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European 
Community Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, reprinted in 4 
Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) ¶ 13,504, and OJ L 95/45 (Apr. 27, 1995), corrected at OJ L 131/38 (15 
June 1995).  Nations have also reached “positive comity” agreements that provide for formal or 
informal requests by a nation that another investigate a matter under its antitrust laws.  See 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the European 
Communities regarding the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their 
competition laws, June 4, 1998, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) ¶ 13,504A; OJ L 173/26 
(18 June 1998). 
 6. Commissioner Karel Von Miert of the Commission of the European Union proposed that 
the World Trade Organization members should agree to enact antitrust laws with “common 
principles or rules on anticompetitive practices with an international dimension and develop 
cooperation instruments and agree to binding arbitration arrangements to assure compliance.  See 
MELAMED, supra note 4.  For the negative American response to that proposal see id.; Joel Klein, 
No Monopoly on Antitrust, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 13, 1998. 
 7. ABB/Elsag-Bailey, Case No. IV/M.139, European Commission decision of 16 Dec. 
1998; In the Matter of Abb Ab and Abb Ag, FTC Docket No. C-1867, 64 F.R. 3130.  See Parker, 
Global Merger Enforcement, supra note 3. 
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internet infrastructure assets.8  On the other hand, in a few notable cases, EU 
and American authorities took decidedly different positions.  Most prominent 
was the FTC’s decision not to challenge Boeing’s acquisition of McDonnell-
Douglas while the EU found that the merger would have anticompetitive 
effects and insisted upon certain changes in Boeing’s exclusive contracting 
practices as a condition of approving the merger.9  Likewise, in the Ciba-
Geigy/Sandoz merger, the FTC required divestiture based on a relevant market 
for gene therapy products and innovation which it believed was adversely 
affected by the merger, while the European Union Commission decided not to 
seek similar relief.10 
The proper role for efficiency analysis in antitrust evaluations of mergers 
and joint ventures figured prominently in American antitrust policy in the 
1990s.  In a series of guidelines and policy statements, the federal enforcement 
agencies attempted to clarify the role efficiencies should play when evaluating 
mergers and joint ventures.  In so doing, they have inadvertently opened the 
door for a full scale weighing of efficiencies at both the prosecutorial and 
judicial levels.  Defendants now regularly assert an efficiency defense in 
litigation and, though none have been outcome-determinative as yet, several 
courts have undertaken to weigh efficiencies in analyzing mergers.11  With EU 
antitrust enforcement evolving from a regime concerned with preserving open 
markets to one more focused on competitive analysis, it would come as no 
surprise if the EU enforcers likewise moved toward explicit weighing of 
efficiencies.12 
All this would be fine if there were a working consensus on such 
fundamental questions as what kind of efficiencies should be recognized, 
whether there were reasonably accurate measurement of harms and efficiency 
benefits, and whether balancing of the two were feasible.  This essay will argue 
that such is decidedly not the case.  It will further contend that transplanting 
the emerging American approach to Europe will heighten uncertainty in the 
review of transnational mergers and perhaps invite nationalism and industrial 
 
 8. See MELAMED, supra note 4. 
 9. Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas, Case No. IV/M. 877, European Commission decision of 30 
July 1997, O.J. L336/16 (Dec. 8, 1997); The Boeing Co., et al., Joint Statement Closing 
Investigation of Proposed Merger and Separate Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, 
FTC File No. 971-0051 (July 1, 1997), reprinted in 5 Trad. Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,295. 
 10. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., et al., Consent Order Issued (Mar. 24, 1997) reprinted in 5 Trad. Reg. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,182.  Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz, Case No. IV/M. 737, Commission Decision of 17 
July 1996, OJ L 201 (July 29, 1997). 
 11. See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D. D.C. 1997); FTC v. Cardinal 
Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 34 (D. D.C. 1998).  See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 12. See Peter D. Camesasca, The Explicit Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: Does It 
Make A Difference?,  1999 E.C.L. REV. 14 (1999) (describing the “implicit efficiency defense” in 
merger assessments performed by the EU’s Merger Task Force and discussing the possibility of 
heightened scrutiny of efficiencies in the future). 
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policy to intrude upon these reviews. Finally, the essay offers a few 
discouraging words and caveats about the capacity of the litigation process to 
handle complex economic inquiries while also warning of the regulatory black 
hole awaiting those who undertake efficiency balancing at the prosecutorial 
level. 
I. THE EMERGING AMERICAN ANTITRUST EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS 
Following up on a commitment made during his confirmation hearings and 
pursuing a topic of long-standing academic interest, FTC Chairman Robert 
Pitofsky initiated in October 1995 a series of hearings concerning the status of 
antitrust law and its role in the changing global economic environment.  One of 
the issues posed by the hearings was whether “American antitrust enforcement 
[has] paid sufficient attention to claims of efficiency.”  Following extensive 
testimony on this subject, the FTC staff issued, in June 1996, a report entitled 
Anticipating The 21st Century: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech 
Global Marketplace.13  Responding to some of the suggestions contained in the 
FTC Staff Report, but not adopting them wholesale, the FTC and the Justice 
Department revised the discussion of efficiencies in their joint guidelines 
governing horizontal mergers in 199714 and more recently issued new 
“Collaboration Guidelines” on the subject of the agencies’ enforcement 
policies respecting joint ventures.15  Though the changes proposed by the FTC 
Staff Report and Collaboration Guidelines are neither new nor radical, they 
evidence a continuation in the law’s drift toward a more comprehensive and 
“dynamic” look at efficiencies in merger and joint venture investigations.  
With the likely diffusion of the federal enforcement agencies’ methodology 
into litigation and judicial decision-making, these changes, if adopted, are apt 
to have an important impact on merger jurisprudence.  This section briefly 
traces the emerging American approach to analyzing efficiencies arising out of 
mergers and joint ventures. 
A. The Revised Merger Guidelines 
Given the rather dismal record of the federal agencies on such issues as 
geographic market and barriers to entry in litigated merger cases, one might be 
a bit surprised that the FTC would voluntarily leap into the efficiencies 
quagmire.  Indeed, having lost more merger cases in federal court than they 
 
 13. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY 
IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) No. 1765 (Special Supp.) (June 6, 1996) [hereinafter FTC Staff Report]. 
 14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, F.T.C., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997), reprinted in 
4 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) ¶ 13,104 [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 15. COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,160-161 [hereinafter 
COLLABORATION GUIDELINES]. 
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have won since the early 1980s, the federal agencies might be accused of 
hastening the day (if it has not already arrived) that horizontal merger 
enforcement takes its place beside vertical and conglomerate merger 
enforcement as a relic of an bygone era.  Moreover, its announced basis for 
considering efficiencies grew out of concerns that ignoring efficiencies in 
antitrust reviews might somehow put America at a disadvantage in the global 
marketplace. This fear seems highly unrealistic given the relative 
sophistication of American antitrust law and the even more restrictive 
approach taken by other antitrust authorities.16  At the same time, there is a 
growing recognition that antitrust law needs to be more sensitive to efficiency 
benefits accruing from mergers particularly through innovation and product 
improvement.17 
Anyone looking for a roadmap through the efficiencies thicket, however, 
will be disappointed by the agencies’ revisions to the Merger Guidelines.  
While they tackle several of the thornier issues, few are decisively resolved. 
Though drafters assert that they add clarity and consistency to the merger 
investigations,18 many critical questions are left unaddressed or are dealt with 
in contradictory or opaque language.  The net effect is to open the door to a 
wide-ranging inquiry by courts or sister antitrust enforcement agencies that 
may not feel constrained by the policy choices or administrative convenience-
driven distinctions that the FTC and Department of Justice decided to draw.  
The following section describes some of the controversy-laden aspects of the 
revisions: 
The Welfare Standard to Be Applied.  This application of the concept of 
efficiency is inextricably linked to one’s view of which concept of welfare the 
Clayton Act was designed to protect.19  Professor Lande and Fisher have 
persuasively argued that Congress’ primary concern with regard to 
anticompetitive mergers focused on preventing transfers of wealth from 
 
 16. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness and the World Arena: Efficiencies and 
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (1996). 
 17. See, e.g., Timothy Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After 
All These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729 (1999); Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised 
United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195 (1992); Joseph 
Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1994).  See also Joseph F. 
Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (1996). The 
seminal proposal for an explicit trade off between efficiency benefits and competitive harms is 
found in the scholarship of Oliver E. Williamson, see, e.g., Economies as an Antitrust Defense 
Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977). 
 18. Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 485 (1999). 
 19. The Report notes the variety of academic views on the purposes and welfare objectives 
of the Clayton Act.  FTC Staff Report, supra note 13, § I-B. 
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consumers to producers.20  Others claim that the proper economic analysis 
centers upon allocative efficiency and hence consideration of gains accruing to 
producers as well as consumers is appropriate.21  The revisions to the Merger 
Guidelines appear to adopt a consumer-focused welfare standard as the 
principal criterion for evaluating efficiencies, but do not entirely foreclose the 
possibility of applying a total surplus test that would countenance mergers that 
enhance market power and do not reduce consumer prices but lower total firm 
costs (and increase its profits).  Hence the Guidelines state that the agencies 
will investigate whether proffered efficiencies “likely would be sufficient to 
reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., 
by preventing price increases in that market.”22  Yet they go on to state that the 
agencies “also will consider the effects of cognizable efficiencies with no 
short-term direct effects on price in the relevant markets.”23  This may signal 
receptiveness, though on terms not yet specified, to considering efficiencies 
under a total surplus test and thus may permit consideration of fixed cost 
savings which are not normally considered under the short-term, price-effect 
test.24 
Timing.  While providing that an ameliorating price effect must be felt in 
the “short term,” this proviso is qualified in a number of ways.  For example, 
the Merger Guidelines state the standard would apply “in most cases,” and that 
“delayed” efficiency benefits will be given less weight.25 Moreover, the time 
period envisioned by the phrase “short term” is not defined.  Whether the time 
horizon used in entry analysis section of the Guidelines (up to two years) is 
appropriate is unclear.26 
 
 20. Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 
71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1592 (1983) (Congress’ primary concern was with “market power that 
would unfairly transfer wealth from consumers to monopolists”). See, e.g., STEPHEN ROSS, 
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW (1993) (legislative history suggests Congress would allow 
efficiency defense only for a merger of small firms); BORK, supra note 1, at 50-71 (arguing that 
narrowly defined consumer welfare, economy-wide allocative efficiency, is the only appropriate 
goal); Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 226, 318 (1960) (“The possibility of lower costs was brushed aside in the 
legislative deliberations and there is every reason to believe that Congress preferred the 
noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited reductions in the cost of 
operations.”). 
 21. BORK, supra note 1, at 50-71 (arguing that narrowly defined consumer welfare, 
economy-wide allocative efficiency, is the only appropriate goal). 
 22. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4. 
 23. Id. § 4 n.37. 
 24. Gregory J. Werden, An Economic Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, 11 
ANTITRUST 12 (Summer 1997). 
 25. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4. 
 26. Id. § 3. 
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Which Efficiencies Count?  The Guidelines list several criteria for 
efficiencies that will be “cognizable.” First, they must be “merger specific,” 
that is, they must be likely to be accomplished through the merger and unlikely 
to be accomplished in the absence of the merger or through other means having 
less anticompetitive effects.27 The Guidelines contemplate the possibility of 
achieving efficiencies by alternative means such as licensing or partial 
divestitures. At the same time, they disavow requiring alternatives that are not 
“practical” or “insist[ing] on a less restrictive alternative that is merely 
theoretical.”28 
A second criterion is that efficiencies be “verifiable.”  By this, the 
Guidelines intend that merging parties must substantiate their claims in a 
manner that permits the agencies to verify the likelihood, magnitude and cost 
of the efficiencies, the manner in which they will enhance incentives and 
abilities to compete, and the reasons why they are merger specific.  While the 
Guidelines do not purport to frame questions in legal terms that a court might 
employ, it is notable that language requiring “clear and convincing evidence,” 
contained in earlier government guidelines was dropped in an earlier iteration 
of the Guidelines.29  At a minimum this change signaled a greater 
receptiveness to efficiencies despite continuing difficulties in proof. 
Finally, the Guidelines list favored and disfavored efficiencies.  Several 
prominent commentators have endorsed a categorization approach that 
classifies efficiencies based on their relative importance and susceptibility of 
proof and contemplates that antitrust tribunals should, as a matter of law, limit 
the defense according to these classifications. For example, Professor Areeda 
and his co-authors proposed that economies of scale and scope should 
generally be recognized, while economies in distribution, promotion and R & 
D which present relatively weak cases for consideration should be subject to 
more rigorous analysis.  Others, such as managerial economies and savings in 
capital cost, procurement, or overhead, should generally not be recognized.30  
By contrast, the Guidelines stop short of ruling out categories of efficiencies, 
instead noting that certain kinds tend to be less likely to be cognizable, 
verifiable or substantial than others. 
Efficiencies Outside the Relevant Markets.  Rather surprisingly, the 
Guidelines indicate that the agencies will consider whether strong efficiencies 
found in markets other than those in which the merger may have 
anticompetitive effects outweigh the potential harms to competition.  Several 
 
 27. Id. § 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103 [hereinafter 1984 GUIDELINES]. 
 30. 4A PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 975 (1998); see also Brodley, supra note 
17, at 579-82 (efficiencies defense should recognize production and innovation efficiencies, reject 
pecuniary and managerial economies, and admit capital raising economies only on a strong 
showing that they are real economies). 
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caveats apply, however.  For example, the magnitude of the efficiencies must 
be large and the risk of anticompetitive harm small.  Also, the markets must be 
“inextricably linked,”31 and the government reserves its option of arguing that 
such effects should be given no weight in court,32 at least when exercising 
prosecutorial discretion.  However, the agencies may elect to trade off 
efficiencies in one market against another. 
How are efficiencies to be weighed?  The Guidelines seem to suggest that 
the agencies do not intend to measure or weigh efficiencies and 
anticompetitive harms in an attempt to calculate the “welfare trade-off.”33  In 
rather opaque terms, they sketch an analytic process that evaluates the effect of 
efficiencies on the overall competitiveness of the market after the merger.34  At 
the same time, however, much of the language of the Guidelines is couched in 
terms of undertaking just such a quantitative comparison.35  For example, the 
Guidelines are clear that efficiency claims must be commensurate with 
potential harms.  In this regard, a sliding scale analysis is employed: large 
anticompetitve effects require “extraordinarily great” efficiencies.  Moreover, 
efficiencies “almost never” justify mergers to monopoly.  By their own 
account therefore, the Agencies envision some quantitative assessment, 
however crude, of losses and gains attributable to mergers. 
Proof Burdens and Presumptions 
The Merger Guidelines are conspicuously silent on the important questions 
of what proof burdens and presumptive rules should apply to the efficiencies 
analysis. Indeed, the 1992 Merger Guidelines36 removed the requirement of 
prior guidelines that efficiencies be proved by “clear and convincing 
evidence.”37  This seems to reflect more than the disinclination of the agencies 
to allocate burdens of proof in their guidelines.  According to a former 
Assistant Attorney General, this change was made to allay concerns that the 
 
 31. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as An Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 
58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also Muris, supra note 17. 
 34. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4 (The agencies “will not simply compare the 
magnitude of cognizable efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm absent the 
efficiencies.  The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of the merger [as indicated by 
concentration data and analysis of effects and entry conditions] the greater must be cognizable 
efficiencies.”). 
 35. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 14, § 4 (showing of “extraordinarily great” 
efficiencies required to forestall challenge where anticompetitive effects are “particularly large” 
are “most likely to make a difference . . . when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the 
efficiencies, are not great”). 
 36. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104. 
 37. 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 29. 
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government was not sufficiently recognizing efficiencies and to make it clear 
that efficiencies would be accorded the same significance as other factors.38 
Paths Not Taken 
The revisions declined to follow recommendations that would have 
confined the inquiry to a set of limited questions that avoid explicitly balancing 
efficiencies against anticompetitive harms or would defer such reviews until 
after the merger had been consummated.  For example, the FTC Staff Report 
proposed a two-part test that would require that proponents of proposed 
mergers to: (1) credibly demonstrate that the merger will create efficiencies; 
and (2) show how the resulting efficiencies will reduce the likelihood that any 
potential anticompetitive effects will arise from the merger and/or will improve 
the competitive dynamic in the postmerger market.39 The merging parties 
would still bear the burdens of demonstrating the efficiencies and establishing 
that they cannot reasonably be achieved through less restrictive means. In 
addition, the FTC Staff Report seemed to suggest that proposed justifications 
should be subject to the test of whether proffered efficiencies are likely to 
change the merged firms’ incentives and abilities so as to deter the possible 
exercise of market power.40  This limited approach neatly avoids having to 
“balance” (and hence specifically calculate the magnitude of) efficiencies and 
anticompetitive losses or to evaluate whether cost savings will be “passed on” 
to consumers. Under this methodology, the clearest case for applying the 
defense occurs where it can be shown that efficiencies exert a positive effect 
on competition by deterring the exercise of market power. For example, 
mergers of non-leading firms may enhance competition by making them more 
formidable rivals, less likely to collude or passively accept price leadership by 
the dominant firm(s). Several other proposals have been advanced to develop 
structured, truncated evaluations of efficiencies that rely on classifications, 
presumptive rules and other methodologies but stop short of attempting to 
balance efficiencies against harms.41 
Another road not taken by the agencies is the use of a subsequent review 
process to evaluate claims by merging parties.  The FTC Staff Report 
recommended that in certain cases, parties should be allowed to consummate a 
proposed merger subject to an agreement.  The FTC or DOJ would then review 
 
 38. FTC Staff Report, supra note 13, ch. 2, § III-H, n.156 (quoting James Rill, a former 
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division). 
 39. FTC Staff Report, supra note 13. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Ann I. Jones, Comments for the Federal Trade Commission, FTC Hearings.  
(visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/jones_ai.htm>.  See also Statement of 
Robert Lande at FTC Hearings, (visited May 1, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC111 
495.htm>; Robert Lande, Remarks at the meeting of the Federal Trade Commission on Global & 
Innovation-based Competition (Nov. 14, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov). 
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ex post whether the merger actually resulted in the claimed efficiencies.  Under 
this procedure, the merged entity would be at risk if the claimed efficiencies 
failed to materialize or if anticompetitive effects arose from the merger. 
Advocates point out that this procedure reduces the incentives for merging 
firms to overestimate efficiency gains and counters the inherent uncertainty of 
predicting efficiencies ex ante. This approach was tested in the 
Hoechst/Marion Merrell Dow merger in which Hoechst was allowed to 
consummate the merger before the FTC had completed its investigation.42 The 
FTC agreed to allow the merger to proceed subject to the acquirer’s agreement 
to divest any of a predefined list of drugs which the FTC could later determine 
in its sole discretion were necessary to divest. In a similar vein, several state 
attorneys general have conditioned approval of mergers on monetary 
settlements predicated on promised efficiency savings.43 
Despite a fair amount of enthusiasm for this idea in academic circles,44 it 
was regarded by the FTC as impractical because of problems associated with 
monitoring the business affairs of the merged entity, difficulties inherent in 
unscrambling completed mergers, and the reluctance of judges to take on 
supervisory responsibilities of this sort.  However, the Report suggested that 
the procedure might be most appropriate for joint ventures and mergers in 
which the parties volunteer and make a credible commitment to divest if 
anticipated efficiencies are not realized.  In view of the criticism offered by a 
number of practitioners that the agencies do not follow their own guidelines 
and almost never conclude at the investigative stage that efficiencies will save 
an otherwise anticompetitive merger,45 this approach would have the salutary 
effect of forcing both sides to perform the efficiencies inquiry in an appropriate 
manner. 
B. Efficiencies in Joint Venture Analysis 
When looking at the agencies’ treatment of efficiencies in joint venture 
analysis, one finds an unambiguous endorsement of balancing.  For example, 
in the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, the agencies 
repeatedly state that an assessment of a health care joint venture requires a 
balancing of the joint venture’s likely pro-competitive efficiencies against any 
 
 42. Hoechst AG, C-3629, 5 Trade Reg. Rept. (CCH) (FTC Dec. 5, 1995). 
 43. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Capital Health Sys. Servs., 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,205 
(M.D. Pa. 1995).  See generally Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency Through the 
Antitrust Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 486-89 (1995). 
 44. See Brodley, supra note 17; Pitofsky, supra note 17.  But see Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, 
Competitiveness and the World Arena: Efficiencies and Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 
ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (1996). 
 45. Mergers and Acquisitions: Trends in Antitrust Oversight of Mergers, Joint Ventures 
Discussed by Practitioners, Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1999). 
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likely anticompetitive effects.  For example, in assessing the impact of 
provider controlled networks, the Policy Statements provide as follows: 
Step 3: Evaluate the Impact of Procompetitive Efficiencies.  This step requires 
an examination of the joint venture’s likely procompetitive efficiencies, and 
the balancing of these efficiencies against any likely anticompetitive effects.  
The greater the venture’s likely anticompetitive effects, the greater must be the 
venture’s likely efficiencies.46 
Essentially identical analytical processes are recommended for evaluating 
health care high technology joint ventures.47  The Department of Justice 
Intellectual Property Guidelines likewise state that the agencies will balance 
procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive effects to determine the 
probable net effect of restraints in licensing arrangements on competition, but 
add the caveat that this comparison “is necessarily a qualitative” one, a 
provision not found elsewhere in Department guidelines.48 
In their most recent guidelines, the Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration 
Among Competitors,49 the agencies provide the most detailed statement of 
their views on weighing efficiencies generated by joint ventures.  Following 
generally the Merger Guidelines’ approach, the Collaboration Guidelines 
require proof of “cognizable efficiencies” that are verifiable and reasonably 
necessary, and then go on to state: 
[T]he Agencies assess the likelihood and magnitude of cognizable efficiencies 
and anticompetitive harms to determine the agreement’s overall actual or likely 
effect on competition in the relevant market.  To make the requisite 
determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely 
would be sufficient to offset the potential of the agreement to harm consumers 
in the relevant market, for example, by preventing price increases (footnote 
omitted). 
The agencies’ comparison of cognizable efficiencies and anticompetitive 
harms is necessarily an approximate judgment.  In assessing the overall 
competitive effect of an agreement, the Agencies consider the magnitude and 
likelihood of both the anticompetitive harms and cognizable efficiencies from 
the relevant agreement. 
 
 46. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996), 4 Trade Reg. (CCH) ¶ 13,153 [hereinafter 
Health Policy Stmt.]. 
 47. Health Policy Stmt. 2, Statement on Hospital Joint Ventures Involving High Technology 
or Other Expensive Equipment; Health Policy Stmt. 3, Statement on Joint Ventures Involving 
Specialized Clinical or Other Expensive Services. 
 48. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (1995). 
 49. Draft of ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS, issued 
Oct. 1, 1999. 
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It thus appears that the agencies have pulled back from earlier policy 
statements that endorsed an open-ended approach to balancing.  In keeping 
with the analysis contained in the Merger Guidelines, joint ventures 
efficiencies apparently will be held to standards of cognizability and 
reasonable necessity.  The Collaboration Guidelines also include an 
appropriate caveat that the process entails approximate judgments, and 
seemingly signal that they may not always essay even rough quantitative 
assessments.  At the same time, however, the truncated analyses contained in 
Collaboration Guidelines evidence no reliance on presumptive approaches or 
other devices that might usefully cabin the factfinders inquiry.  It is not entirely 
clear whether this approach reflects refinements in the agencies’ methodology 
for analyzing efficiencies or whether it is dictated by the special circumstances 
created by joint ventures.  Although a more lenient approach for joint ventures 
might be justified because of their less permanent nature and hence lower risk 
of harm, realizing efficiencies nonetheless may be problematic in the joint 
venture setting because of the parties’ unwillingness to fully share advantages 
and learning in such an enterprise.50 
C. Assessing the American Approach 
Despite extensive attention paid to the subject, proponents of an expanded 
efficiencies defense for mergers and joint ventures have failed to muster a 
convincing showing that prior antitrust policy chilled parties from undertaking 
mergers that would benefit consumers or that government action blocked such 
mergers.51  Given the generous levels of concentrations permissible under 
current merger law (which most commentators agree allows parties to capture 
most scale and scope economies),52 and the leniency with which contemporary 
antitrust doctrine interprets mergers,53 it is not likely that many mergers fail to 
achieve efficient size.  Further, the evidence points strongly to the conclusion 
that determining ex ante whether a merger will generate significant efficiencies 
is an extraordinarily difficulty task. Thus, studies demonstrating that a large 
number of mergers fail to realize projected efficiency gains illustrate that those 
in the best position to assess the probability and magnitude of prospective 
efficiencies, the merging parties themselves, routinely err.54 Indeed, by some 
 
 50. See generally Brodley, supra note 17. 
 51. For broad assurances that efficiency trade offs can be performed, see Robert Pitofsky, 
FTC Staff Report on Competition Policy: Six Months After, Remarks Before the ABA Section on 
Antitrust Law (Nov. 7, 1996).  For strong expressions of skepticism, see Brodley, supra note 17; 
AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30. 
 52. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30. 
 53. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness and the World Arena: Efficiencies and 
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (1996). 
 54. DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC 
EFFICIENCY (1987); After the Deal, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1999 (explaining that “study after study 
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estimates, sixty to eighty percent of all mergers prove unsuccessful.55  When 
one expands the inquiry into critically important, but necessarily inchoate, 
dimensions of efficiency such as quality of  health care products and  services 
or synergies resulting from shared know-how, technology or research, the level 
of imprecision and subjectivity in efficiency analysis escalates geometrically.56  
Adding the further “dynamic” dimension of assessing the degree to which 
efficiencies may or may not diffuse throughout markets as a result of a merger 
or joint venture also seems essential,57 though the process invites complexities 
likely to exceed he capacities of the courts.  With the empirical record raising 
legitimate questions about how effectively courts and enforcement agencies 
can predict and quantify efficiencies, it would seem appropriate to hold 
proponents of a more complete trade-off analysis to prove the predictive 
reliability of their methods. 
On the other side of the balancing ledger, the prospects for accurate 
analysis appear even bleaker.  Neither the measures of concentration nor other 
structural indices give a very accurate picture of the magnitude of competitive 
harm resulting from mergers. Imprecision in the definition of markets and 
calculation of concentration data, along with the lack of information about firm 
strategies, makes reliable estimates of the likely losses impossible.58  Most 
courts seem to recognize this and thus resort to evidentiary or presumptive 
short cuts to avoid the process.59 Even those that use the terminology of 
balancing are not actually assigning a common unit of measurement to the 
harms and benefits and then determining which outweighs the other.60 
Another notable feature of the efficiency approach is the absence of useful 
rules for performing the inquiry.  While the least-restrictive alternative test 
 
of past merger waves has shown that two of every three deals have not worked . . . [although] 
buyers have justified deals by citing questionable synergies”).  See also The Case Against 
Mergers, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 30, 1995 (noting that businesses often cannot predict accurately which 
mergers are likely to create efficiencies). 
 55. Brodley, supra note 17, at 576. 
 56. See Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care through the Antitrust 
Laws, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 465, 491-92 (discussing the problems of performing efficiency 
analyses in the health care sector).  See generally Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Efficiencies in 
Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (1996). 
 57. Gary L. Roberts & Steven C. Salop, Efficiency Benefits in Dynamic Merger Analysis, 
WORLD COMPETITION (1996). 
 58. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30, ¶ 976 (noting that “in the great majority of cases we can 
do no better than play a hunch about the magnitude of competitive harms resulting from a 
merger.”). 
 59. See discussion of efficiencies defense in merger litigation infra; see also Brodley, supra 
note 17, at n.38 (survey of cases through 1996 involving efficiency defense, finding sixteen cases 
in which courts evaluated less restrictive alternatives and none which evaluated efficiencies in 
any meaningful way; one case, U.S. v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1991), 
employing conclusory assessment of competitive effects and efficiency benefits). 
 60. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 30, ¶ 976. 
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avoids balancing, it cannot be said to constitute a substitute; at best it 
circumvents the inquiry, but provides no assurance that consumer interests will 
be addressed in merger reviews.61  Merger simulations using econometric 
methodologies does not afford a silver bullet for evaluating efficiencies in 
mergers and joint ventures.  Those methodologies provide only insights into 
the anticompetitive effects of the merger and are unhelpful regarding the 
quantification of efficiencies and are subject to considerable discretion in 
application.62  The conclusion that balancing “is simply not what courts are 
capable of doing”63 seems inescapable. 
How are courts likely to react to the Agencies’ approach to efficiencies?  
Although the several merger and joint venture guidelines expressly disavow 
any intention to describe how the agencies will present evidence in litigating 
merger cases,64 courts frequently cite the Guidelines and sometimes hold the 
government to those standards where it appears they are advocating a different 
position in court.65  It is far from clear that, in performing efficiency analyses, 
courts will feel constrained to follow the Guidelines’ limitations which are not 
sharply defined or clearly explained or are based on considerations of 
administrative convenience.  In sum, although they commonly use shortcuts to 
truncate (or sidestep) the inquiry, courts generally perceive their task as 
conducting an open-ended balancing of harms against savings and rarely resort 
to tools such as classifying efficiencies, use of the consumer standard or 
otherwise narrow the scope of the efficiency trade-off. 
D.  Efficiencies Analyses in Litigation 
Although the Supreme Court stated over forty years ago that “possible 
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality in Section 7 merger cases,” 
virtually all courts considering the issue in recent years have permitted an 
efficiencies defense at least to the extent that it may be used to rebut the 
government’s prima facie case.66 Courts tackling the efficiencies issue have 
 
 61. Cf. Brodley, supra note 56 at 585 (stating that the least restrictive alternative test “must 
lead either to strained applications or illfounded attempts to engage in explicit balancing”). 
 62. See Craig W. Conrath & Nicholas A. Widnell, Efficiency Claims in Merger Analysis: 
Hostility or Humility?, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 685 (1995). 
 63. Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 2; BORK, supra note 1; Brodley, supra note 56 (noting 
that leading proponents fail to explicate how balancing might take place). 
 64. MERGER GUIDELINES § 0.1.  Although efficiencies have influenced the FTC’s decision 
not to challenge a few mergers since the amendments to the Merger Guidelines, the litigated 
cased decided since 1997 have not entailed the kind of balancing approach suggested by the 
guidelines.  See Robert Pitofsky, Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers:  Two Years After, 7 GEO. 
MASON. L. REV. 485 (1999). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 743 F.2d 976, (2d Cir. 1984). 
 66. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (defendant may rebut 
the government’s prima facie case with evidence showing that the merger would create 
significant efficiencies in the relevant market); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 45 
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several times found substantial efficiencies,67 though sometimes mitigating that 
finding by concluding that the efficiencies were not merger specific or were 
equally likely to be forthcoming from competition in the market.68  Others 
have rejected defendants’ proffered efficiencies as speculative, unverified, or 
uncertain.69  Commentators have noted the symmetry between the conclusions 
reached by courts on the competitive effects of mergers and their resolution of 
the efficiencies defense.  Most courts finding substantial efficiencies do so 
only where they also conclude that the merger would not be likely to 
substantially lessen competition.70 
For better or worse, hospital mergers have become a proving ground in 
American courts for weighing efficiencies in antitrust cases. These cases are 
instructive in that they demonstrate the unwillingness of antitrust tribunals to 
face up to the task of balancing efficiencies and the intractable nature of many 
of the factual issues that arise. As a result, most courts have employed 
evidentiary presumptions and relied on the placement of the burden of proof to 
evade trade off analyses. 
In some respects, the hospital industry is well-suited for efficiencies 
analysis; in others, decidedly not.  Clearly, the industry suffers from significant 
overcapacity attributable to government policies, inefficient reimbursement 
methodologies and rapid technological change causing shifts in where many 
procedures are performed.71 Moreover, conditions on both the demand and 
supply side are changing rapidly to deal with the new environment.  These 
cataclysmic changes occurring in heath care financing and delivery make it 
extraordinarily difficult to predict with confidence what kinds of savings are 
 
(D.D.C. 1998) (recognizing defense but finding that substantial efficiencies that would be 
achieved by merger could also be attained by competitive process); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. 
Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997) (considering but ultimately rejecting as unverified and not 
merger-specific defendants’ claimed  efficiencies); United States v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 
983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Cf.  FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1141 (D.D.C. 
1986) vacated as moot, 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 67. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 45; Long Island Jewish Hosp., 983 F. Supp. 121.  
See also Tenet Healthcare Corp. v. FTC, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that 
district court should have paid greater attention to efficiencies). 
 68. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 45. 
 69. FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. 17 F. Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 1998), rev’d on other 
grounds, 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999); Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1090. 
 70. Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 516 (1994). 
 71. See Joe Sims, A New Approach to the Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 64 ANTITRUST L. J. 
633 (1996) (contending that the peculiarities of hospital markets require altering application of 
conventional presumptions in merger analysis; also urging more receptive treatment of 
defendants’ efficiency claims). 
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attributable to a given merger and what less restrictive alternatives might 
exist.72 
Federal courts have closely examined defendants’ efficiencies claims in 
seven hospital merger cases.  In three of those cases, the district court made 
rather cursory findings to the effect that defendants had presented plausible 
efficiency claims.73 One other district court relied in part on evidence of 
efficiencies in finding that the hospitals had rebutted the government’s prima 
facie case,74 and another endorsed in dicta the defendants’ claim.75 In the only 
appellate case,76 three district court cases,77 and several FTC administrative 
proceedings78 on the subject, defendants’ proof on the efficiencies has been 
found wanting.  For their part, the federal enforcement agencies have taken the 
position that they may weigh efficiencies in deciding whether or not to 
challenge a merger,79 while occasionally arguing that efficiencies 
considerations are not cognizable by federal courts. 
Several observations may be made about the decided cases.  First, with one 
exception, courts have followed a pattern of symmetry between their findings 
on the merits of the government’s merger case and their treatment of 
efficiencies.  That is, courts ruling for defendants on other grounds uphold 
their efficiency claims, while those concluding that the merger will lessen 
competition reject efficiencies claims.80  Courts thus may be taking the easy 
way out on this complex issue. 
Second, a number of courts have held defendants to a high standard of 
proof, e.g., “clear and convincing evidence” on efficiencies defenses.81  The 
cases also sometimes fault defendants for failing to prove “net efficiencies”: 
 
 72. See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and 
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 1991 (1997). 
 73. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D.  Va.), aff’d, 892 F.2d 
1042 (4th Cir. 1989); FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,444 (S.D. Ga. 
1991), rev’d, 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 74. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2385 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
 75. See Long Island Jewish Hosp., 983 F. Supp. 121. 
 76. See Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206. 
 77. Tenet, 17 F. Supp.2d 937, United States v. Mercy Hosp., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 
1995); United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 78. American Medical Int’l, 104 F.T.C. 1, 219-20 (1984); Hospital Corp. of Amer. 106 
F.T.C. 361 (1985).  See generally Mary Lou Steptoe, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, 
Federal Trade Commission, Efficiency Justifications for Hospital Mergers, Remarks before 
Practicing Law Institute (June 17, 1994). 
 79. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 4 (1992).  The government’s changing position on efficiencies is described in the 
FTC Staff Report, supra note 13, ch. 2, § I-C. 
 80. The lone exception is United States v. Mercy Hospital, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 
1995). 
 81. See, e.g., Rockford Mem’l, 717 F. Supp. at 1289; Hospital Corp. 106 F.T.C., at 361. 
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that is, in quantifying efficiencies, defendants neglected to deduct the cost of 
achieving savings from the total savings anticipated.82  The latter has been an 
important issue as hospitals claiming efficiencies arising out of renovation and 
replacement of facilities must offset the costs of those improvements along 
with any changes in quality.83  Other courts have relied upon credibility 
findings regarding the parties’ experts or the probative value of the information 
on which they relied. Finally, many courts have noted that defendants have 
failed to prove that efficiencies would be passed on to the consumer.  These 
techniques have enabled courts to evade the difficult factual inquiry into the 
magnitude of efficiencies and the degree of potential anticompetitive harm 
flowing from the merger. 
Third, while a wide variety of efficiencies have been considered in various 
cases, those involving economies in scale and scope, as well as savings 
resulting from combined administrative functions, have proven the most 
successful.84  Indeed, in litigation, the government has often conceded the 
validity of such efficiencies in principle while vigorously disputing their 
magnitude or the feasibility of their being implemented. As a general matter, 
the agencies take the position that preferred efficiencies include better use of 
fixed cost assets and elimination of duplicative services, while other kinds of 
efficiencies, such as savings in the cost of capital and shared inputs, are 
suspect, primarily because they can often be accomplished without merger.  
Scale economies and other savings, from consolidating programs operated at 
less than efficient levels, are readily identifiable and estimated.85 Courts have 
been skeptical of purported savings resulting from improved information and 
use of “best practices” resulting from mergers, contending that such savings 
readily obtained through other means and were difficult to quantify.86  Notably, 
in the most recent hospital merger case, the Eighth Circuit found that the lower 
court should have explicitly weighed quality-enhancing aspects of the merger 
against anticompetitive harms under an efficiency analysis.87  Thus, the 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. For a good analysis of this issue, see Steptoe, supra note 78. 
 84. See, e.g., Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206 (savings from eliminating equipment duplications 
and administrative savings); Rockford Mem’l, 717 F. Supp. at 1288 (elimination of duplicative 
services, consolidation of overhead); Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213. 
 85. A clear explanation of the economist’s methodology for appraising efficiencies in 
hospital merger cases is found in Barry C. Harris & William P. Hall, Balancing Efficiencies and 
Competition in Hospital Mergers, 8 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., No. 3, 2 
(1994). 
 86. Mercy Hosp., 902 F. Supp. at 987-89. 
 87. In Tenet v. FTC, the court stated as follows: 
We further find that although Tenet’s efficiencies defense may have been properly 
rejected by the district court, the district court should nonetheless have considered 
evidence of enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of the merger. 
The evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more efficient than Lucy Lee or 
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litigated cases have sidestepped many important but hard-to-quantify 
efficiencies. 
Finally, in the hospital cases, the efficiencies defense has become an 
invitation to explicit regulation by court decree. In F.T.C. v. Butterworth 
Health Corporation,88 for example, the court found that the merger would 
produce significant “capital avoidance” savings.  Notably, the district court 
accepted the efficiencies defense without explicitly weighing the purported 
savings (found to be in excess of $100 million) against any specific finding of 
potential harm to competition.  The potential harm to competition, the court 
acknowledged, was manifest in that case because the merger created a near 
monopoly in the relevant market.  It found this risk mitigated by the merged 
hospital’s not-for-profit status and the parties’ voluntary commitment to take 
various steps to assure that prices would be kept low. Remarkably, these 
commitments, contained in a court-approved consent decree, include 
provisions freezing prices at pre-merger levels, limiting profit levels, assuring 
services to the medically needy, and establishing governance of the merged 
entity.  In implicitly finding that efficiency savings would outweigh whatever 
competitive harms might result from the merger, however, the court explicitly 
acknowledged its inability to calculate net efficiencies or to perform the 
welfare trade-off.89  Instead, it noted a disparity in the quality of the studies 
performed by the parties’ experts, voiced its greater confidence in the 
defendants’ expert, and gave considerable weight to its own impressions based 
on a tour of the hospital facilities in the relevant market. Other district courts 
have likewise used rather vague findings of efficiencies to buttress their 
conclusions that the merger would not lessen competition.90 
The rather loose and imprecise approach to “weighing” efficiencies against 
harms seen in the hospital merger cases, though perhaps understandable in 
view of the uncertainties involved, is a far cry from the balancing anticipated 
by proponents of the efficiencies defense.  In addition, it should be emphasized 
that assessing efficiencies is particularly hard in a case in which the market is 
changing rapidly.  For example, the court opined that Butterworth would likely 
 
Doctors’ Regional will provide better medical care than either of those hospitals could 
separately. The merged entity will be able to attract more highly qualified physicians and 
specialists and to offer integrated delivery and some tertiary care. 
186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 88. 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
 89. The court stated: 
Because measuring the efficiencies of a proposed transaction is inherently difficult and 
because both sides’ estimates are clearly based in some measure on speculative self-
serving assertions . . . the [c]ourt finds it neither appropriate nor necessary to engage in a 
detailed evaluation of the competing views. 
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301. 
 90. See supra note 73. 
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proceed with plans to renovate and expand its facilities in order to compete 
with the new state of the art facility planned by Blodgett, concluding “a 
medical arms race would thus continue, at great expense to defendants and 
ultimately to consumers.”91  Such findings obviously rest on a myriad of 
assumptions about the pace of development of managed contracting, the 
current competitiveness of the market, and other factors.  Confident judgments 
about how much would be spent in the future absent the market seem so 
speculative as to call into question the capacity of courts to make such 
predictions confidently in a changing market. 
II. TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES UNDER THE EU MERGER REGULATION 
Contrary to assertions by American antitrust officials that competition 
authorities in the Commission of the European Union and its member states 
regularly take efficiencies into account when reviewing mergers,92 efficiencies 
have played a negligible role in European analyses.  Though this claim was 
made to justify an expanded role for efficiencies in American enforcement, it 
does not withstand close scrutiny.  This section argues that EU competition 
policy has refrained from adopting an explicit efficiencies defense and that 
efficiencies have rarely, if ever, played an important role in decisions to clear 
mergers or accept restructuring proposals. 
Mergers with a “community dimension”93 in the EU are governed by the 
Merger Regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers in 1989.94  The 
regulation mandates prior notification of proposed “concentrations” to the 
competition directorate (DG-IV) of the Commission.  A substantive review of 
mergers is generally performed by the Merger Task Force at the Commission.  
The Merger Regulation governs “concentrations” and mandates an inquiry as 
to whether they are compatible with the common market, interpreted to 
prohibit any that “creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of 
which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it.”95 Although the Merger Regulation does 
not speak to the issue of extraterritorial enforcement, the Commission has 
invoked jurisdiction in a number of recent cases.96 
 
 91. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301. 
 92. Remarks of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, The Effect of Global 
Trade on United States Competition Law and Enforcement Policies (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 93. Council Regulation 1310/97 of June 30, 1997 O.J. (L 180) (amending Merger Regulation 
to reach mergers in which the undertakings have a combined worldwide turnover of at least $2.5 
billion ECU; in which each undertaking has an EU wide turn over of at least 100 million ECU; 
and other requirements respecting turnover in at least three Member States). 
 94. Commission of Council Regulation 4064/89. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Jurisdiction has been asserted in cases in which the merging parties have limited assets 
in the EU, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas; and in which the assets of the merging parties giving rise 
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The Merger Regulation contains no provision governing efficiencies.  
However, under Article 2(1)(b), the Commission is directed to consider 
whether a concentration will likely result in “the development of technical and 
economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and does not 
form an obstacle to competition.”97  The language of Article 2(1)(b) is derived 
from Article 85(3) and is construed in light of the decisions of the European 
Court of Justice and other jurisprudence surrounding that doctrine.98  Although 
Article 85(3) has had some influence on the development and analysis of 
agreements in the EU, the concept of technical and economic progress has 
played almost no role in substantive merger analysis by the Commission.  
Indeed the history99 and text100 of Article 2(1)(b) does not support explicit 
trade-offs between efficiencies and market power.  Consequently, most leading 
commentators agree that no efficiency defense can be found in EU merger 
analyses to date.101 
A review of the handful of cases in which the Commission has considered 
potential advantages associated with technical and economic progress resulting 
from mergers, reveals that the factor has not played a role in any clearance by 
the Merger Task Force and at most appears to have been considered as a factor 
 
to competition concerns are located outside of the EU, Gencor/Lonrho, Case IV/M619 (Apr. 24, 
1996) 1997 O.J. (L11) 30. 
 97. EU Merger Regulation Article 2(1)(b). 
 98. See Commission of European Communities, Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy 
266 (1990). 
 99. Earlier drafts of the Merger Regulation contained broad language that might have 
allowed an efficiencies trade off, as well as non-economic factors, to trump a finding of market 
dominance. Deletion of this language, along with amendments rendering the final text of the 
Article 2(1)(b) moot on the use of technical and economic factors once dominance is found, make 
it clear that the regulation does not support a trade off analysis.  See Pierre-Emmanuel Noel, 
Efficiency Considerations in the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under European and U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 8 E.C.L. REV. 498, 503-04 (1997); CHRISTOPHER JONES & F. ENRIQUE 
GONZALEZ-DIAZ, THE EEC MERGER REGULATION 153-58 (1992); see also SIR LEON BRITTAN, 
COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 47 (1991).  
(“[N]o words plucked from the [Merger] Regulation can give rise to a defence against the finding 
that there is a dominant position.”). 
 100. Economic and technical benefits are only relevant to the extent that they do not “form an 
obstacle to competition.” EU Merger Regulation, Article 2(1)(b). 
 101. See, e.g., JONES & GONZALEZ-DIAZ, supra note 99, at 156 (“there can be no efficiency 
defence as such to a finding of durable dominance under the regulation”); C.J. COOK & C.S. 
KERSE, E.C. MERGER CONTROL 167 (1996) (“There is no efficiency defence in the Regulation, in 
the sense recognised in North American merger controls, and none has emerged from the 
Commission’s application of it so far.”); Noel, supra note 99, at 512 (finding “no ‘efficiency 
defence’ as such” in EU merger regulation). See also BARRY E. HAWK & HENRY L. HUSER, 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MERGER CONTROL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 265 (1996) (technical 
and economic progress and efficiencies have played only “minor role” in Commission 
enforcement); Camesasca, supra note 12 (finding an “implicit efficiencies defence” sometimes 
used to “tip the balance” against a finding of dominance). 
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militating in favor of acceptance of remedial undertakings to allow mergers to 
proceed.  In the leading case, Aerospatiale-Alenia/deHavilland,102 the 
Commission examined a variety of efficiency-related advantages of the 
proposed consolidation including improved management, cost savings in parts 
procurement and marketing, and protection against currency fluctuations.  
However, the Commission rejected the importance of such advantages because 
of the merger’s propensity to enhance the dominant position of the combined 
firm will be necessary. The decision refrained from endorsing the principle of 
employing efficiencies as a counterweight to competitive concerns,103 and its 
holding seemed to imply that most efficiency arguments will be unavailing in 
the case of a finding of dominance.104  Likewise,  in MSG Media Service105 the 
Commission concluded that a joint venture would improve the prospect for the 
spread of digital pay television through improved administrative and technical 
support, but stated that such a factor should be considered only where the 
concentration did not create or strengthen a dominant position or hinder 
effective competition.  In a number of other cases, the Commission also 
expressly noted the potential for improvements in firm efficiency that would 
enhance technological and economic progress but resisted clearance on those 
grounds.106  Other Commission decisions can be seen to take efficiencies 
improvements into account “between the lines” by incorporating analyses of 
the dynamics of markets in entry analyses, market definition and evaluation of 
the significance of market share data.107 Finally, in a number of cases the 
Commission has employed findings of enhancement of efficiencies to bolster 
its conclusion that the merger will increase or create market dominance.108 
The EU’s reluctance to adopt an explicit efficiencies defense or to 
incorporate efficiencies into its assessment of competitive effects may be as 
much attributable to the fact that the Commission has until recently largely 
 
 102. Case No. IV/M.053 (Oct. 2, 1991), OJ L334/42 (Dec. 5, 1991). 
 103. See id. ¶ 65 (“Without prejudice as to whether [efficiency] considerations are relevant 
for assessment under Article 2 of the Merger Regulations, such cost savings would have a 
negligible impact on the overall operations” of the merged entity). 
 104. See JONES & GONZALEZ-DIAZ, supra note 99, at 158 (explaining that the de Havilland 
decision confirms that “there can be no efficiency defence where there is clear market 
dominance”). 
 105. Case No. IV/M.469 (Nov. 9, 1994), O.J. L364/1 (Dec. 31, 1994). 
 106. See Accor/Wagon Lits, Case No. IV/M.126 (Apr. 28, 1992), O.J. L 204/1 (July 21, 1992) 
(insufficient proof that claimed efficiencies would outweigh anticompetitive effects); Nordic 
Satellite Distrib., Case No. IV/M.490 (1995) (vertical integration creating significant scale and 
scope efficiencies insufficient given propensity to strengthen dominant position). 
 107. See Camesasca, supra note 12, at 25-27 (summarizing cases in which efficiencies issues 
played an important role in Commssion’s dynamic analysis of markets and competitive effects). 
 108. See, e.g., Du Pont/ICI, Case No. IV/M, 214 (Sept. 30,1992), O.J. L 7/13.  See Frederick 
Jenny, EEC Merger Control: Economies as an Antitrust Defense or an Antitrust Attack? 1992 
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 591 (1993). 
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focused on cases involving single firm, rather than collective, dominance. 
Mergers enhancing risks of oligopolistic market power may raise somewhat 
different efficiencies issues in that efficiencies gains arising from a merger that 
are not readily duplicated by rivals may reduce the likelihood and ease of 
coordination.109  Hence, a stronger case for considering efficiencies may 
present itself as the Commission evaluates more collective dominance cases.  It 
is important to note, however, that such evaluations going to the likelihood of 
the exercise of market power can be made independently and without need to 
undertake a trade-off analysis.  Hence, the EU’s increasing focus on collective 
dominance does not support adoption of the overall analytic approach taken by 
the American antitrust authorities. 
In sum, owing to its different history and goals, merger policy in the EU 
has followed a trajectory that has to date steered away from the quagmire of an 
explicit efficiencies defense. Undoubtedly, efficiencies have played a part in 
many aspects of the Commission’s application of the merger laws, but they 
have never risen to the level of offsetting competitive harms associated with a 
merger.  Hence, far from justifying the American movement toward fuller 
evaluation of efficiencies through explicit trade off analysis, the roles of the 
two authorities appear to be just the opposite.  The EU may now be in a 
position of facing pressures to follow suit to keep up with its American 
counterpart and perhaps to leave itself the “flexibility” to endorse mergers that 
suit political rather than competition-focused goals. 
III. RISKS OF EU ADOPTION OF THE AMERICAN STANDARD 
Embracing the American efficiencies defense to mergers and joint ventures 
would serve neither the EU’s interest in effective antitrust enforcement nor 
promote the need for a more certain set of rules governing border-spanning 
mergers.  First, as discussed in Section I of this essay, a myriad of normative 
judgments and policy choices confront antitrust authorities devising an explicit 
efficiencies defense.  The vigorous disagreement among academics and policy 
makers concerning the appropriate welfare standard to be applied should give 
pause to EU competition authorities.  Extensive debate on that subject has not 
produced consensus, as first principles and normative judgments play an 
important role in choosing a standard.  The significance of the choice of 
welfare standard cannot be overstated, as it strongly influences the complexity 
of the efficiencies inquiry and the ease with which the defense can be asserted.  
Leaving the standard ambiguous, as the United States has apparently done, 
may invoke ad hoc applications of the doctrine and raise the cloud of 
“political” jurisprudence. 
 
 109. See HAWK & HUSER, supra note 101, at 267-68. 
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Second, the ex ante predictions required for analyzing efficiencies are 
notoriously imprecise.  The absence of a proven track record of forecasting 
efficiencies and the dearth of accepted methodologies for doing so counsel 
caution before enshrining a broad policy that will absolve otherwise 
anticompetitive mergers. Where empirical judgments necessary to bring 
enforcement actions are prone to high rates of error, merging parties will face 
strong incentives to opportunistically seek out mergers that they would 
otherwise forego.  In this connection, it is notable that at many junctures the 
American efficiency defense leaves wide discretion to the decisionmaker.  The 
approach of the Merger Guidelines has been to weigh heavily administrative 
concerns and adopt pragmatic solutions, while leaving open the opportunity to 
consider broad evidence where deemed appropriate.  While flexibility is 
desirable at the prosecutorial stage, the absence of reviewable standards and 
clearly articulated doctrine poses obvious problems when the matter appears 
before antitrust tribunals.  In this regard, the experience of the American courts 
is instructive and discouraging.  Faced with the inherent uncertainties and 
complexities of the efficiency inquiry, courts have resorted to evidentiary 
shortcuts and other measures that fall far short of a meaningful balancing of 
efficiencies and harms.  In some instances, they have developed tests that make 
little economic sense (e.g., the requirement that efficiencies be passed on to 
consumers).  In others they have resorted to evidentiary sleight of hand (e.g., 
relying on findings concerning the credibility of experts or assigning 
dispositive weight to internal studies). In the end, the results of judicial 
efficiencies inquiries seem pre-ordained by the courts’ conclusions on 
competitive effects. 
The impact of a potent efficiencies defense on reviews of transnational 
mergers and joint ventures raises a host of additional concerns.  The mix of 
inherently uncertain factual determinations and discretion-laden decisional 
rules would seem an open invitation to ad hoc judgments.  Given the inevitable 
political and nationalist undercurrents when governments review transnational 
combinations, the efficiencies defense would seem to afford an all-too-
convenient tool for disguising industrial policy as competition analysis.  To 
give one pertinent example, permitting efficiencies justifications in one market 
to offset anticompetitive effects in a second market poses real risks of this 
kind.  Antitrust enforcers may be strongly tempted to protect mergers having 
anticompetitive effects abroad where efficiencies will be realized by domestic 
firms. In such scenarios antitrust law can be corrupted to serve as a vehicle for 
externalizing costs of mergers and promoting national interests.  To be sure, 
such risks are present in applying other aspects of merger analysis.  However, 
where doctrine is ill-defined, the corrective pressures of international scrutiny 
may not be as effective. 
A second consequence of an expanded efficiencies defense is the 
likelihood of a “race to the bottom” among antitrust authorities.  Faced with 
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the prospect of being seen as applying an overly-restrictive efficiencies test as 
compared to that of other competition authorities, enforcers may well conclude 
that the best policy is a lenient policy.  Such perceptions can easily ratchet 
antitrust standards downward, as a kind of Gresham’s Law fosters dilution of 
enforcement involving mergers with an international dimension.  Even if 
national authorities avoided this downward spiral, deference to each others’ 
judgments in merger cases would be less likely. Given the lack of transparency 
in efficiency analyses, second-guessing of mergers cleared by foreign 
authorities with greater economic interests and access to information seems 
inevitable.  Not only would this slow progress towards harmonization of 
merger standards, but, by making bilateral enforcement less effective, it would 
also increase international frictions and encourage confrontations of the sort 
experienced in the McDonnell Douglas/Boeing merger. 
Finally, the American experience with efficiency defense illustrates the 
paradox that such reviews push antitrust authorities toward imposing highly 
regulatory restrictions in order to assure that efficiencies are actually achieved 
and passed on to consumers.  Restructuring, mandatory licensing, price-freezes 
and other edicts have become familiar remedies in settlements that allow 
mergers to go forward.  Where efficiencies are the central issue, however, 
these remedies take on a decidedly intrusive flavor that may include outright 
supervision of rates or output.  The desire of enforcement agencies to “lock in” 
the promised savings and ensure that consumers will benefit from them has led 
some American enforcement agencies and courts down a slippery slope toward 
outright rate regulation.  In accepting highly regulatory consent agreements, 
these enforcers have assumed a role they are institutionally ill-equipped to 
perform.  Applying similar remedies to international mergers would unwisely 
blur the line between competition policy and trade regulation and would serve 
to strengthen the hand of those who advocate industrial policy solutions to 
economic problems. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Antitrust guidelines serve the public interest when they reflect a strong 
consensus about appropriate antitrust policy and articulate standards that 
clarify the factual and legal determinations made by agencies and the courts.  
Where consensus and clear standards are lacking, as was the case with the 
Justice Department’s analysis of entry barriers in the 1982 iteration of its 
Merger Guidelines, they may actually increase confusion and uncertainty.110  
This essay places the American efficiency defense guidelines in the latter 
category.  The EU is best advised to stay clear of the entanglements these 
 
 110. See Jonathan Baker, The Problem with Baker-Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry 
Analysis in Merger Analysis, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 353 (1997); Richard Schmalensee, Ease of 
Entry: Has the Concept Been Applied Too Readily?, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1987). 
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guidelines are likely to foster and thereby prevent the potential politicization of 
international merger reviews. 
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